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[Abstract:   Based on an empirical study in West Bengal, this paper  attempts to examine 
whether women‟s involvement in the microcredit programme through SHGs makes any 
positive change  on women‟s empowerment that appears from the assessment on various 
indicators of power, autonomy and self-reliance, entitlement, participation , awareness 
and capacity-building. The study suggests that if women participating in the microcredit 
programme through SHGs sustain for some longer period (eight years                                                                                           
or more), such a programme might contribute to higher level of women‟s empowerment 
than all types of control groups under study.] 
1.      THE PROBLEM 
     Why lend to women rather than to men? Nobel laureate Prof. Yunus (1998) is of 
the view that if the goals of economic development include improved standard of living, 
removal of poverty, access to dignified employment and reduction of inequality then it is 
quite natural to start with women. They constitute the majority of the poor, the under 
employed and the economically and socially disadvantaged. Hunger and poverty are 
more women‟s issues than male issue. Women experience hunger and poverty in much 
more intense ways than men. If one of the family members has to starve, it is an 
unwritten law that it has to be the mother. They are very close to children. When a 
destitute starts making some income, her dream invariably centre on her children. He also 
finds that traditional banks in Bangladesh are gender biased and do not want to lend 
money to women. Moreover, “a development reason to favour women”, he says, “the 
more, I got involved, the more I realised that credit given to women brought about 
changes faster than when given to men”. (Yunus, 1998:88).  
 
       How does credit given to women bring about changes to women?  The theme of 
Microcredit Summit, 1997, stressed on two issues to bring about changes to women: of 
reaching women and empowering them. Most of the self-help groups (SHGs) that are 
formed under current microcredit initiatives are those of women. There is no doubt about 
the fact that, given the current systems of microcredit, women have access to credit. 
However, empowerment is not dependent on mere access but on control of both the credit 
and the use to which that credit is put. Access does not automatically include control 
(Burra et.al. 2005:44). While evaluating the effect of microfinance programme on women 
empowerment, several studies yield mixed results. Some are in favour of the argument of 
the ability of microfinance to induce a process of economic, political and social 
empowerment whereas others, being more skeptical, point to a deterioration of women‟s 
overall well-being. 
        As to women‟s empowerment is concerned, generally the effects of the programme 
are largely positive (Rahman, 1986; Pitt and Khandker, 1995; Mahmud, 1994; Amin and 
Pebly, 1994; Huda and Mahmud, 1998; Steele et.al., 1998, Mayoux, 1998, Mahmud, 
2003 Murthy et.al, 2005, Holvoet, 2005).  Based on the findings from an ethnographic 
study and quantitative survey of Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC), Hashemi, Schuler and Riley (1996) argued that involvement in 
„minimalist credit programme‟ does empower women by strengthening their economic 
roles, increasing their ability to contribute to their families‟ support. Minimalist credit 
programmes enabled women to negotiate gender barriers, increased their control over 
their own lives and improved their relative positions in the household.  
             Critics of minimalist credit argue that women‟s access to credit reinforces 
patriarchal norms of women‟s subordination, resulting to worsening of gender 
relationship and disempowerment (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Montgomery et.al., 1996; 
Rahman, 1999). Goetz and SenGupta (1996) find that a significant proportion of 
women‟s loans are directly invested by their male relatives, though women borrowers 
bear the liability for repayment. The phenomenon of loss of control of loan by women 
borrower and the intense pressure of timely repayment of loan increase tension and 
frustration within the family which produces new form of  dominance over women by the 
members of family as well as microfinance institutions and that increase violence in the 
society (Rahman, 1999: 67). 
       How empowerment often is operationalised through decision making outcomes? 
Both sociology and economics have subfields concerned with intra household relations 
and within these both have theories relying on access to resources to explain differences 
in power and welfare outcomes within household. They extend the theories to include 
social norms, values and culture as intervening variable in the ability to translate 
resources into intra household power, particularly for women. This is associated with 
Sen‟s(1999) idea of well-being freedom in order to access women‟s well-being versus 
just relying on these access to inputs. Micro level contexts in some contexts does not 
support that only in improvement in women‟s resources lead to their improved status 
(Jejeebhoy and Sathar,2001;Kabeer,1997;Malhotra and Mather,1997;Mizan,1994).The 
allocation of authority and control within household structures by social norms and 
values produce unequal gender relations where men command authority and resources 
(Kabeer,1995:224-28). In the  household affairs, working women may successfully 
bargain over certain aspects  of household expenditure but what remains non-negotiable 
is men‟s control over asset management decisions based on land, capital and  other 
valuable assets related to household‟s affairs (Pant,2000:94). Moreover, if a family builds 
property assets, it will have other sources of funds available to survive a crisis and thus 
become less dependent on strategies more harmful to women (Kantor, 2003:438). 
Likewise, women‟s welfare outcomes of a family are influenced by mobility decision 
since women themselves are constrained by the female seclusion norms about which 
families make decisions. Women‟s mobility levels have direct effects on women‟s ability 
to create and maintain links with people outside the family, including those who can help 
improve the operation of their enterprises (ibid). 
     How does the Women’s membership of SHGs lead to empowerment? Since 1970, 
worldwide, policy makers and academicians started thinking as to how development 
programmes could be linked to poor women. There has been considerable rethinking on 
the impact and potential of self-help groups (SHGs) on rural poverty and empowerment 
of women since the Grameen bank first pioneered the concept in 1979. Professor 
Mohammad Yunus, Nobel laureate in peace, came up with this idea of providing small 
loans to the neighborhood poor households, particularly poor women households, those 
unable to provide collateral. The problem of women‟s access to credit was given 
emphasis at the first International Women‟s Conference in Mexico in 1975, which 
resulted in the establishment of the Women‟s World Banking network. In 1985, during 
the second International Women Conference in Nairobi, there was a mushrooming of 
government and non-government income generating programmes for women, most of 
which included savings and credit. 
         The existing literature suggests that the concept of formation of SHGs and linking 
to banks would raise incomes and broaden financial markets by providing credits to small 
scale entrepreneurs and thereby reduce poverty ( Aghion and Morduch, 2000). It would 
also lead to women‟s empowerment since Micro Finance Programmes have mostly 
targeted women as clients (Littlefield, Morduch and Hashemi, 2003; Cheston and Kuhn, 
2002). 
        The acceptance of gender equality in the Constitution of independent India provided 
women with a basis for a new identity, as full citizens of the republic and a source of 
their rights to equality, dignity and justice in other spheres of life (Gupta and 
Chattopadhyay, 2004: 111). Since the inception of the Fifth Five year Plan (1974-79) in 
India, women‟s interest have been highlighted into national policy (WCD, 2001).The 
SHG model was introduced as the core strategy to achieve empowerment in the Ninth 
plan (1997-2002) with the objective to organize women into SHG and thus mark the 
beginning of a major process of empowering women (Planning Commission, 1997). 
        Based on an empirical study of West Bengal, this paper thus attempts to examine 
whether women‟s involvement in the microcredit programme through SHGs makes any 
positive change under different criteria – power, autonomy and self-reliance, entitlement, 
participation and awareness and capacity-building- on women‟s empowerment. The 
underlying   hypothesis is: (i) the average level of empowerment of women participating 
in the micro credit programme is higher for both NGO and non-NGO led programme 
than that of women participating in the microcredit programme among all control groups; 
and (ii) no perceptible difference is observed at the level of empowerment between NGO 
and non-NGO led microcredit programme under women SHGs (core group). 
 
2.      SURVEY   DESIGN   
          The study is based on the data obtained from field survey (Primary source) from 
rural West Bengal. Final field survey is conducted on 370 households. More importantly, 
out of total households (370 households) selected for final survey, there are one 
core(policy) group(120 households) who were randomly selected from women SHGs 
participating under microcredit programme on SHG-NGO and SHG-Non-NGO  models 
for eight years or more, and three types of control groups
1
. The procedure of selecting 
households under core group and three control groups is in the following lines.  
      We conducted our field survey in Howrah, Hooghly, North 24 Paraganas and Nadia 
districts of West Bengal, the area of our study, under two stages-preliminary stage and 
final stage. We undertook pilot survey at preliminary stage mainly for two reasons. i) As 
per the secondary data (SIPRD, 2000 &2001;Sarker,2001), the microcredit programme is 
observed to be operative under two broad categories – SHG-NGO and SHG-non –NGO 
models- in West Bengal. Each category is further classified in three models
2
. But in 
practice, NGO as Microfinance Institution and NGO as financial intermediaries do not 
exist separately while we conducted our survey. They are clubbed into a single category 
in our study area: NGO as financial intermediaries which is operative as one of  the 
models of NABARD ( NABARD, 2001-02). ii) To study the impact assessment of  
women borrowers‟ group( core/policy group)participating under SHG-NGO and SHG-
non –NGO models of microcredit programme of this study, we consider those SHGs 
which exist in the programme  for eight years or more  at a stretch. But in practice, most 
SHGs which appeared in the secondary source were defunct while we conducted our 
survey. However, to select samples for final survey for core and control groups, we had 
to depend on pilot survey in some specific rural blocks having high concentration of 
SHGs under four districts- Howrah, Hooghly, North 24 Paraganas and Nadia – of West 
Bengal.  
    The selection of households for each group (core or control groups) for final survey is 
made on sequential sampling method. First, based on the procedure of SRSWOR, sample 
of SHGs for each group is made from population of SHGs obtained from pilot survey, 
and  then households  for each group are also randomly selected(SRSWOR) from sample 
SHGs from the same group. But, it is worthwhile to mention that the selection of SHGs 
for each group is made on the principle that the population of the same group for each 
model should be at least double of the sample. 
       As regards the selection of households for core group is concerned, at the first stage, 
some SHGs have been randomly selected from all SHGs which appear from our pilot 
survey and that are participating under micro credit programme for eight years or more 
related to the respective micro credit agency/ organization.  15 SHGs have been randomly 
selected for each model from out of 36 SHGs in Model 1 and 33 SHGs in Model 2 under 
SHG-NGO category. Similarly, 10 SHGs for each model have been randomly selected 
from out of 25 SHGs in Model 3, 24 SHGs in Model 4 and 22 SHGs in Model 5 under 
SHG –non- NGO category of total women SHGs which appears from pilot survey Also 
important to mention that the variation of the number of selection of SHGs for each 
category (SHG-NGO/ SHG-non-NGO) is due to non availability of equal number of 
SHGs, which exist eight years or more, in the pilot survey.  At the second stage, 30 user 
members for each of two models under SHG-NGO category out of 15 sample SHGs and 
20 user members for each of three models under SHG-non-NGO category out of 10 
sample SHGs have been randomly selected (SRSWOR).The number of household for 
each category (SHG-NGO/ SHG-non-NGO) selected for final survey differ from each 
other because the number of households that appears from pilot survey is also different 
for different categories.. Total size of women sample borrowers (core/policy group) 
selected for final survey is (30*2+20*3) =120. 
         As regards the first control group is concerned, sequential sampling has also been 
used for selecting 40 men users of micro credit who are participating in the micro credit 
programme for eight years or more. At the first stage, 10 SHGs have been randomly 
selected from  24 men SHGs, which appears from pilot survey,  who are participating in 
the micro credit programme for eight years or more under Tajmahal  Gram Bikash 
Kendra of model-2 from SHG-NGO model, where NGO acts as financial 
intermediaries(FI). 5 SHGs have been randomly selected separately from 13 SHGs 
each,(emerging from pilot survey) of model-3 and model-5  respectively from SHG –
non-NGO model. Totaling in all, 20 men SHGs have been selected from model-2 (10 
SHGs), model-3 (5SHGs) and model-5 (5 SHGs). The argument behind the exclusion of 
other models from the sample is that all micro credit agencies under model-1 and model -
4 are exclusively of women. At the second stage, for selecting households under first 
control group for final survey, 20 user (male) members‟ households are randomly 
selected from Tajmahal Gram Bikash Kendra under model -2 of SHG-NGO micro credit 
programme. But for model-3 and model-5 under SHG-non-NGO led micro credit 
programme 10 user (male) members‟ households for each model have been randomly 
selected from the respective male SHGs selected at the first stage. Total size of male 
sample borrowers who have been participating in the micro credit programme at a stretch   
for eight years or more has been fixed at 40 (20+10+10). 
       Concerning to the selection of second control group, two types of SHGs, operating 
under micro credit programme for at best one year, have been taken into consideration- 
women SHGs and male SHGs. For selection of women borrowers‟ households under 
control group, 15 women borrowers‟ households from each model under SHG-NGO 
category, are randomly selected from each 7 SHGs operating at best one year under 
respective model selected at the first stage by the pilot survey, and 10 women borrowers‟ 
households from each model under SHG-non- NGO category, are randomly selected 
from each 5 SHGs (operating at best one year) under respective model selected at the first 
stage from the pilot survey. It is worthwhile to mention that the selection of SHGs of 
each model under the second control group is based on the criterion of close proximity 
(nearest in distance) of the SHGs of each model under core group. However, total female 
borrowers under second control group is (15*2+10*3) =60. Similarly, the selection of 
male borrowers under second control group is made following the same criteria used in 
selecting women borrowers under second control group. Owing to the lack of existence 
of male SHGs, operating at best one year and within close proximity (nearest in distance) 
of the SHGs under core group, the sample of male borrowers under second control group 
is less in relation to the female borrower under the same control group. Thus, as per the 
availability of data, 10 men borrowers‟ households have been randomly selected for each 
of Model 2, Model 3 and Model 5. The number of men SHGs for each model     operating 
at best one year is 7 which appears from pilot survey.  Total male sample under second 
control group is 10*3=30. 
     In order to select the households (120 households) for the third control group through 
„propensity score matching‟3, 120 households have been selected randomly from 250 
households, who are eager to join the micro credit programme but have not yet joined the 
programme, from pilot survey. However, combining core group and three types of 
control groups (first, second and third control group) together, total sample size taken for 
final survey is 370 [120(core group) +40(1
st
 control group)+90(2
nd
 control group) 
+120(3
rd
 control group)] and all samples for this study have been taken from 4 districts – 
Howrah, Hooghly, 24 Paraganas(North) and Nadia. The Preliminary (pilot) survey and 
final surveys have been conducted between March, 2006 and August, 2007. 
2.     METHODOLOGY 
       Empowerment is a multidimensional on-going process.  In view of its 
operationality and ability to capture the level and process of women‟s empowerment, 
five broad elements - power, autonomy and self-reliance, entitlement, participation 
and awareness and capacity-building - have been taken into account. A scheme 
representation of elements together with its various indicators for assessing 
empowerment of women is presented in the following Structure:                          
 
 
                 ELEMENTS       OF        EMPOWERMENT 
   
 
 
POWER     AUTONOMY           ENTITLEMENT       PARTICIPATION    BUILDING 
                           &                                                                                        AWARENESS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                  SELF-RELIANCE                                                                                 &                         
                                                                                                                          CAPACITY 
 
 
                                                 
 
          EAS1  EAS2  EAS3  EAS4                                  EPP1  EPP2  EPP3 
 
 
                                                        
                                                    EEN1  EEN2  EEN3 
            
 
 
 
EPO1  EPO2    EPO3  EPO 4   
 
 
 
         
 
         EAC1  EAC2  EAC3  EAC4  EAC5  EAC6  EAC7  EAC8  EAC9  EAC10  EAC11 
 
Indicators of ‘power’ (I) element: 
1) Ability to take decision at the household level  (EPO 1) 
2) Ability to control resources  (EPO 2) 
3) Ability to control sources of power  (EPO 3) 
4) Ability to challenge societal power relation  (EPO 4) 
Indicators of ‘Autonomy and Self-reliance’ (II): 
1) Freedom of action  (EAS 1) 
2) Possession of critical elements to effectively and efficiently undertake desired 
activity  (EAS 2) 
3) Level of sense of self  (EAS 3) 
4) Absence of unsolicited influence in decision-making  (EAS  4) 
Indicators of ‘Entitlement’ (III): 
1) Rights to equitable share of resources i.e.  „Exchange entitlement‟ (EEN 1) 
2) Rights to equitable share of inherited property i.e.  „Inheritance and Transfer 
entitlement‟  (EEN 2) 
3) Rights to equitable access to resources  (EEN 3) 
Indicators of ‘Participation’ (IV): 
1) Level of influencing decision (EPP 1   ) 
2) Level of providing material, labour, finance and management input to the 
project/programme  (EPP  2) 
3) Level of acceptance of responsibilities/ consequences of decision (EPP 3) 
Indicators of ‘Building of awareness and capacity’ (V) : 
1) Ability to manage productive resources  (EAC  1) 
2) Ability to develop alternative economic structures locally (EAC 2  ) 
3) Ability to create alternative employment at local level (EAC  3) 
4) Ability to interact effectively in public sphere  (EAC 4  ) 
5) Ability to participate in non-family group (EAC 5) 
6) Action to bring gender equality  (EAC  6) 
7) Legal and political awareness  (EAC  7) 
8) Ability to organize struggle  (EAC  8) 
9) Ability to fight injustice  (EAC  9) 
10) Ability to transform institutions (family, education, religion) ( EAC 10) 
11) Ability to transform structures (legal, political, economic and social)  (EAC  11) 
            Every indicator of each element has been measured by four- point scale: high (4), 
medium (3), fair (2) and low (1).The criteria for evaluation related to the  assessment of  
each indicator is in the following: 
 
INDICATORS  FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE  ‘POWER’ELEMENT 
 
Criteria for evaluation 
 
INDICATORS   
OF   „POWER‟ 
ELEMENT OF 
EMPOWERMENT 
 
HIGH 
(4) 
MEDIUM 
(3) 
FAIR 
(2) 
LOW 
(1) 
EPO 1: Power to 
make decision at 
household level 
a)Equal or  
more say in  
acquiring, 
 using & 
divesting  
fixed assets 
      _    a) Very little 
or  
no say in  
acquiring, 
 using & 
divesting  
fixed assets 
 b) Equal or  
 more say 
 in routine 
 income&  
expenditure 
b) Equal or 
 more say 
 in routine  
income&  
expenditure 
   _ b) Very little 
or  
 no say 
 in routine 
 income&  
expenditure 
 c) Equal or 
 more say 
 in selecting 
employment 
c) Equal or  
more say 
 in selecting  
employment 
   _ c) Very little 
or no say 
 in selecting 
employment 
 d) Equal or 
 more say in 
children‟s 
education, 
health etc. 
d) Equal or 
 more say  
in children‟s 
education, 
health etc. 
a) Equal or 
   more say  
in children‟s 
education, 
health etc. 
d)Very little 
or  no say in 
children‟s 
education, 
health etc. 
EPO 2: Ability to 
control resources 
Complete 
ownershipof 
resources. 
Equal 
ownership of 
resources. 
Partial 
ownershipof 
resources. 
No 
ownershipof 
resources. 
EPO 3: Ability to 
control sources of 
power 
Ability to be 
head of a 
body/ 
institution. 
Ability to make 
someone head of 
the local 
body/institution. 
Ability to be 
member of 
the local 
body. 
Inability to be 
member of 
the local 
body  
EPO 4: Ability to 
challenge societal  
power relations. 
Ability to 
mobilise 
mass . 
Ability to resist 
individually. 
Ability to 
raise issues 
in local body 
. 
Inability to 
raise a voice 
in public 
forum. 
 
 
 
INDICATORS   OF THE  ‘AUTONOMY &SELF-RELIANCE’ 
            
Criteria for evaluation 
 
INDICATORS  
OF 
 „AUTONOMY 
& SELF-
HIGH 
(4) 
MEDIUM 
(3) 
FAIR 
(2) 
LOW 
(1) 
RELIANCE‟   
 
EAS 1: Freedom 
of action 
&   mobility 
a)Purchase 
assets without 
consulting with 
husband /any 
male member  
a)Purchase 
assets after 
consulting 
withhusband 
/any male 
member  
 
   _ 
a)Very little or 
no freedom to 
purchase assets. 
 b)Full freedom 
to purchase 
household 
chores. 
b)Full freedom 
to purchase 
household 
chores. 
a) Freedom to 
purchase 
household 
chores after 
consulting 
with husband  
b)Very little or 
no freedom to 
purchase 
household 
chores . 
 c)Work outside 
the village (sole 
decision) 
c)Work outside 
the village 
after 
consulting with 
husband 
 
           _     
c)Very little or 
no freedom to 
work outside the 
village . 
 d)Freedom in 
deciding 
number of 
children they 
can have & 
adopting family 
planning 
measure 
 
               _ 
 
 
          _ 
d)No freedom 
 in deciding 
number of 
children they 
can have & 
adopting family 
planning 
measure 
 e)Freedom in 
choosing life 
partner 
              _  e) Nofreedom in 
choosing life 
partner 
 f)Visits bank, 
NGO office 
alone 
f)Visit bank, 
NGO office 
(not alone) 
 f)Nofreedom to 
visit bank, NGO 
office 
 g)Visits health 
centre alone 
g)Visit health 
centre (not 
alone) 
 g)can‟t visit 
health centre 
 h)Visits natal 
home (sole 
decision) 
h)Visits natal 
home   after 
consulting with 
husband 
Visits natal 
home   after 
consulting 
With husband  
h)No freedom to 
visit natal home 
(sole 
EAS 2: 
Possession of 
critical elements 
(human K) 
a)woman‟s 
level of 
education –
secondary or 
above  
a) )woman‟s 
level of 
education –
primary 
a)woman‟s 
level of 
education –
primary 
a)woman is 
illiterate or can 
sign only 
 b)woman is 
experienced for 
7-8 years 
b)woman is 
experienced for 
1-2 years 
b) No 
experience 
b) No 
experience 
 c)woman is 
fully trained 
c)woman is 
partially 
trained 
c)No training c)No training 
 d)health-good d)health-good d)health-not 
good 
d)frequently 
sick 
EAS 3:Sense of 
self 
a) woman 
protests 
alone&if 
necessary 
informs to local 
P.S. 
 
 
        _ 
 
 
         _ 
a)Very little or 
no ability to 
protest. 
 b) feel the 
importance of 
education 
&training for 
women.  
a) feel the 
importance of 
education 
&training for 
women. 
 
 
        _ 
b)Very little or 
no feelings 
 c)feel the need 
of safe & 
protected 
shelter & 
sanitation for 
women 
b) feel the need 
of safe & 
protected 
shelter & 
sanitation for 
women 
a)feel the 
need of safe 
& protected 
shelter & 
sanitation for 
women 
c) Very little or 
no feelings 
 c)feel the need 
of 
equal amt.of 
food for 
women. 
c)feel the need 
of equal amt.of 
food for 
women. 
 
        _ 
d)Very little or 
no feelings 
EAS  4: Absence 
of unsolicited 
influences in 
decision making. 
a)None can 
influence 
woman‟s 
decision 
making. 
a)Only 
husband can 
influence 
woman‟s  
decision 
making. 
a)Any elder 
member of 
family can 
influence 
woman‟s 
decision 
making. 
a)Anyone can 
influence 
woman‟s 
decision 
making. 
 
 
 
          INDICATORS OF ‘ENTITLEMENT’ 
                                                        Criteria for evaluation 
INDICATORS  
OF 
‘ENTITLEMENT’   
 
HIGH 
(4) 
MEDIUM 
(3) 
FAIR 
(2) 
LOW 
(1) 
EEN 1:Exchange 
Entitlement 
a)women get 
same type of 
job. 
a)women get 
 same type of 
job. 
a)women get 
 inferior type 
of job. 
women get 
 no job. 
 b)women 
earn moreor 
equal 
by selling 
non-labour 
asset 
b)women earn 
equal 
by selling 
non-labour 
asset 
women earn 
 equal 
by selling 
non-labour  
asset 
women earn 
 lower 
by selling 
non-labour  
asset 
 c)women 
earn more or  
c)women earn 
equal 
women earn 
low 
women earn 
low 
equal by 
selling 
labour asset 
& her power 
of manage 
-ment is 
high/ equal 
by selling 
labour asset but 
power of 
management is 
low. 
by selling 
labour asset & 
power of 
management is 
low 
by selling 
labour asset & 
power of 
management is 
low 
 d)Cost of 
purchasing of 
resources is 
equal 
or low. 
d)Cost of 
purchasing of 
resources is 
equal. 
Cost of 
purchasing of 
resources is 
equal. 
Cost of 
purchasing of 
resources is 
more. 
 e)Value of 
the 
product that 
she 
can sell is  
equal /more. 
Value of the 
product that 
 she can 
sell is low. 
Value of the 
product that 
 she can 
sell is low. 
Value of the 
product that 
 she can 
sell is low 
  
f)women 
&men 
get same 
wage. 
 
women get 
 low wage 
 
women get 
 low wage 
 
women get 
very low wage 
 g)women 
&men 
receive equal 
social benefit 
&pay equal 
tax. 
women &men 
receive equal 
social benefit 
& 
pay more tax. 
women  
receive lower 
social benefit 
&pay more 
tax. 
women  
receive lower 
social benefit 
& unable to 
pay taxes 
 
EEN 2: 
Inheritance& 
Transfer 
Entitlement 
 
Women 
&men inherit 
property 
equally 
&selling 
power of the 
property is 
equal. 
 
Women &men 
inherit property 
equally 
&selling power 
of the property 
is lower for 
women. 
 
Women &men 
inherit 
property but 
not equally 
&selling power 
of the property 
is low. 
 
Women &men 
inherit 
property not 
equally but 
selling power 
of the property 
is nil 
EEN 3:Access to  
resources 
a)Equal 
accesss to 
immovable 
property 
        _          _       Nil 
 b) Equal 
accesss to 
durable 
&movable 
property 
Equal accesss 
to durable 
&movable 
property 
 
       _ 
      Nil 
 c)Equal 
financial 
access 
Equal financial 
access 
       _        Nil 
 d)Equal Equal access to Equal access to       Nil 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDICATORS OF ‘PARTCIPATION’ 
 
Criteria for evaluation 
 
INDICATORS  OF 
„PARTICIPATION‟   
 
HIGH 
(4) 
MEDIUM 
(3) 
FAIR 
(2) 
LOW 
(1) 
EPP 1: Level of 
 influencing  
decision in a 
project 
women  
influence 
decision at the  
stage of 
„conception‟, 
„implementation‟ 
& 
„operation‟ 
women  
influence 
decision at 
 any two 
 stage of  
project 
 life. 
women  
influence 
decision at 
any one  
stage of  
project 
life. 
women  
never 
influence 
decision.  
  
EEN 2: Level of 
providing material, 
labour, 
finance&management 
to the project/ 
programme. 
women provide all 
four inputs. 
women provide 
material, 
labour&finance 
 
women 
provide 
material+ 
labour or 
finance+ 
labour. 
 
women 
provide  
labour but not 
adequately. 
 
EEN 3:Level of  
acceptance of 
responsibility/ 
consequences of 
decision 
 
always follow the 
decision held in the 
meeting& 
accordingly perform 
their 
duty. 
women 
sometimes 
follow the 
decision. 
women  
follow the 
decision 
in a few cases 
only 
women have 
no 
responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
access to 
personal 
health care. 
personal health 
care 
personal health 
care 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDICATORS OF ‘BUILDING AWARENESS &CAPACITY’ 
 
Criteria for evaluation 
 
INDICATORS   
OF  „BUILDING 
AWARENESS  
&CAPACITY‟  
 
HIGH 
(4) 
MEDIUM 
(3) 
FAIR 
(2) 
LOW 
(1) 
EAC 1:Ability to 
manage  
productive 
resources 
women 
themselves  
use resources for  
the desired 
purpose 
Sometimes 
women  
use &sometimes 
 men use but  
women 
supervise it. 
Only men  
use the 
productive  
resources 
,women 
supervise it 
but power of  
supervision 
low 
women never 
use 
&never  
supervise it. 
 
EAC 2:Ability to 
develop alternative 
economic structure 
locally 
women form 
cooperative 
 at the village 
level &it runs  
successfully 
women have  
formed  
cooperative 
but they don‟t 
always get cheap 
inputs or 
marketing  
facility. 
women form 
cooperative at 
the village 
level but it 
does not run  
successfully 
No formation 
of cooperative 
by women. 
EAC 3: Ability to 
create alternative 
employment at local 
level 
Create at least 3 
alternative  
employment. 
Create at least 2 
alternative  
employment 
Create at least 
1 
alternative  
employment 
Create no 
alternative  
employment 
EAC 4:Ability to 
interact effectively in  
public sphere  
Ability to interact 
effectively in 
most of the 
public spheres. 
Ability to 
interact 
effectively in a 
few 
public spheres. 
Ability to 
interact 
effectively  
only in local 
club/SHG 
Inability to 
interact 
effectively in 
any public 
sphere. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
            For the sake of simplicity, all indicator of each element of empowerment in the 
exercise have been treated as having equal weights, though in practice, the weights tend 
to differ across indicators. There are four indicators of „Power‟ (EPO), four indicators of 
‘Autonomy and Self-reliance’ (EAS), three indicators of ‘Entitlement’ (EEN), three 
indicators of ‘Participation’ (EPP) and eleven indicators of ‘Awareness and Capacity 
building’ (EAC).An individual who scores “high” on all indicators of “power” element, 
has a total score of 16 (4 multiplied by 4), while that who scores “low” on all indicators 
of “power” element, has a total score of 4 (1 multiplied by 4). But the average score 
(simple arithmetic mean) for the former is 4 (total score divided by total indicators of 
power), while the latter is 1 ((total score divided by total indicators of power).The 
average score of a particular element of empowerment represents its level i.e. the highest 
level an individual may score from „power‟ is 4, the lowest score being 1. Similarly, the 
mean (A.M.) of all elements‟ level indicate the empowerment value of the selected 
women. However, the highest empowerment level for an individual woman is 4, whereas 
the lowest is 1. 
 
3.  RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
      
            Five important elements namely   – power, autonomy and self-reliance, 
entitlement, participation and awareness and capacity-building have been adopted to 
measure the level of women‟s empowerment of this study. As mentioned in the 
methodology chapter, every indicator corresponding to each element has been measured 
by four point scale with equal weight. The range of empowerment level lies between 4 
(the highest level of empowerment) and 1 (the lowest level of empowerment). 
                              We first attempt to measure the level of empowerment based on each 
element of women‟s empowerment. Power is the key element of empowerment because it 
is the ability, actual and potential, to exercise command and control over resources and 
ideology (Pant, 2000:93). Out of highest average score 5, the average score received by 
all female borrower groups in all models – NGO and non –NGO –ranges between 2.33 
and 2.80 (Table1.1). It implies that all female borrower groups (core group) receive the 
level of power which is either little less than their median or somewhat higher than their 
median level, although in most cases average score is higher than their median level 
(Table 1.1). This result is not far from unity for entitlement element of empowerment 
(Table 1.3), although the performance of scores is  the highest for participation element 
of empowerment (Table 1.4), and much better for autonomy and self-reliance (Table 1.2). 
However, for one element of empowerment (process of building awareness and capacity 
building), the average level of scores is lower than their median level for four models out 
of five, despite the fact that individual average scale for each model is greater than or 
equal to 2.0 (Table 1.5). 
    On the other hand, for all elements of empowerment (Table 1.1-1.5), the average  level 
of scores is much lower than their median level for first control group (male borrower 
group participating in the micro credit programme for at least eight years) ,second control 
group (male and female participating in the micro credit programme for at best one year) 
and third control group (female have not at all participated in the microcredit programme 
but have the potential to join the programme) compared with female borrower group 
(core group of study). No significant difference is observed regarding average level of 
scores among three control groups. 
          Combining all elements together, Table 2 shows that the level of women‟s 
empowerment under female borrower group is considerably higher (ranging between 
2.50 and 2.84) than either of the first control group ( male borrower groups )-ranging 
between 1.52 and 1.77-or of the second control groups (ranging between 1.36 and 1.54 ) 
or of the third control group( ranging between 1.16 and 1.28 ).Although empowerment 
level for male borrower group is somewhat higher than other two control groups ,no 
discernable difference of the level of empowerment is observed among three control 
groups. This study, however, seems to support our hypothesis( i )that the average level of 
empowerment of women participating in the micro credit programme is higher for both 
NGO and non-NGO led programme than that of women  participating in the microcredit 
programme among all control groups. This study also lends credence to the fact that  no 
perceptible difference is observed at the level of empowerment between NGO and non-
NGO led programmes under female borrower group (core group), which seems to 
support our hypothesis( ii ). 
         However one of the main issues emerging out from this study  is that women‟s own 
involvement and participation in the micro credit programme contribute to the higher 
level of empowerment than all control groups. Male‟s participation does not point to any 
significant improvement to the women‟s empowerment level (first control group). Rather 
the patriarchal power relation in the male SHGs, which participate in the microcredit 
programme for at least eight years (first control group),or both male and female SHGs 
participating in the microcredit programme for at best one year (second control group), or 
both male and females who have not at all participated in the microcredit programme but 
have the potential to join the programme (third control group), does not seem to provide 
equal space for women in the process of women‟s empowerment. Studies have also 
revealed that consumer‟s choice is irrelevant to women under patriarchal power structure; 
neither as producer nor as consumer does women have the freedom of choice allotted to a 
women (Bell, 1977); even in public patriarchy, the appropriation particularly of women‟s 
labour is a more collective level (Walby, 1990); women‟s subordinated position is 
represented by patriarchal power (Batliwala, 1993).  
        However, there are instances that considerable improvement in women‟s 
empowerment has made by women‟s participation in decision making and has shown an 
impressive curtailment in male monopoly of assets in AWARE (Action for Welfare and 
Awakening in Rural Environment) villages (Narasimham,1999). Narasimham‟s(1999) 
study also supports that women‟s participation in the micro credit programme for some 
longer duration (core group) has more positive impact on women‟s empowerment. 
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
              
    This study, however, lends credence to the fact that women‟s active involvement in 
micro credit programme through SHGs supported by various agencies – SHG-NGO / 
SHG-non –NGO – has resulted in attitudinal and visible changes among women and has 
increased their ability to deal with their problems, particularly, in respect of household‟s 
asset management, own mobility, health status of children and the member of 
households. Such a programme has also helped them to gain some access and control 
over their own income, if not equally with their male counterpart. However, women‟s 
micro credit programme through SHGs, supported by various agencies, needs to be 
expanded under comprehensive community development programme in all areas of West 
Bengal, not only as one of the most important means of empowering women and 
augmenting their households‟ income and assets but also for utilizing women‟s 
knowledge and skills as full partners in the developmental process. 
             As the empowerment strategies of empowerment encompass individual, 
interpersonal and institutional level of practice (a multilevel process), large and dynamic 
NGOs and institutional organizations should involve in executing training for women‟s 
skill development, expansion of their education, building women‟s perception of self-
worth of members within the household and in the public sphere. Such an effort might 
help women to assert their independent rights to make choices and control resources, both 
which will assist in challenging and eliminating their subordination. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE    1.1 
 
LEVEL OF „POWER‟ ELEMENT 
 
 
   Source: sample survey 
   The figure in ( ) represents the figure corresponding to control group 1 (male borrower group) 
   The figure without bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 2 (those who  
   have joined at best 1 year). 
   The figure in [  ] bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 3 (those who  
   have not joined at all but have the potential to join the microcredit programme). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Female  borrower group Control group 
NGO-led non-NGO-led 
Indicators 
of„power‟ 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
EPO  1 2.83 2.93 
 
2.80 
 
2.60 2.60 
 
1.35 
 
[1.01] 
2.20 
(1.85) 
[1.70] 
1.60 
(1.90) 
[1.75] 
1.60 
 
[1.40] 
1.65 
(1.70) 
[1.55] 
EPO  2 
 
2.80 
 
 
 
2.43 
 
 
2.30 
 
 
2.10 1.95 1.40 
 
[1.13] 
1.20 
(1.45) 
[1.20] 
1.30 
(1.50) 
[1.19] 
 
1.40 
 
[1.10] 
1.30 
(1.20) 
[1.05] 
EPO  3 2.93 2.87 
 
3.55 
 
2.45 2.80 
 
1.85 
 
[1.25] 
2.00 
(2.05) 
[1.70] 
1.85 
(2.10) 
[1.55] 
2.00 
 
[1.50] 
1.75 
(1.40) 
[1.20] 
EPO  4 2.60 2.57 
 
2.65 
 
2.15 2.35 
 
1.15 
 
[1.05] 
1.90 
(1.40) 
[1.30] 
1.25 
(1.50) 
[1.05] 
1.40 
 
[1.15] 
1.35 
(1.20) 
[1.00] 
AVERA
GE 
LEVEL  
2.79 2.70 2.80 2.33 2.43 1.40 
 
[1.11] 
 
1.83 
(1.69) 
[1.48] 
1.50 
(1.75) 
[1.39] 
1.60 
 
[1.29] 
1.51 
(1.38) 
[1.20] 
  
 
TABLE    1.2 
 
LEVEL OF „AUTONOMY & SELF-RELIANCE‟ 
 
 
Source: sample survey 
The figure in ( ) represents the figure corresponding to control group 1 (male borrower 
group). 
The figure without bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 2 (those 
who have joined at best 1 year). 
The figure in [  ] bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 3 (those 
who have not joined at all but have the potential to join the microcredit programme). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 Female Borrower Group Control Group 
NGO-led non-NGO led 
Indicators of 
„autonomy 
& self-
reliance‟  
  
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
EAS  1 2.83 2.87 
 
2.85 
 
 
2.85 2.65 
 
1.50 
 
[1.15] 
2.30 
(1.45) 
[1.50] 
1.70 
(2.30) 
[1.55] 
1.90 
 
[1.50] 
1.70 
(1.70) 
[1.45] 
EAS  2 2.83 2.83 
 
3.04 
 
 
2.65 2.40 
 
1.95 
 
[1.67] 
1.60 
(2.30) 
[1.90] 
1.75 
(2.10) 
[1.30] 
2.10 
 
[1.70] 
2.25 
(1.80) 
[1.55] 
EAS  3 3.03 3.03 
 
3.25 
 
 
2.90 2.90 
 
2.10 
 
[1.70] 
2.30 
(2.20) 
[1.45] 
2.20 
(2.80) 
[1.80] 
2.60 
 
[1.20] 
2.55 
(2.60) 
[1.50] 
EAS  4 2.77 3.03 
 
2.70 
 
 
2.60 2.60 
 
1.35 
 
[1.20] 
2.10 
(1.75) 
[1.35] 
1.55 
(1.90) 
[1.30] 
1.60 
 
[1.20] 
1.65 
(1.70) 
[1.50] 
AVERAGE 
LEVEL 
2.87 2.94 2.96 2.75 2.64 1.70 
 
[1.43] 
2.10 
(1.93) 
[1.55] 
1.80 
(2.30) 
[1.49] 
2.05 
 
[1.58] 
2.04 
(1.95) 
[1.56] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE    1.3 
 
             LEVEL OF „ENTITLEMENT‟ ELEMENT 
    
 
                                     
Source: sample survey 
The figure in ( ) represents the figure corresponding to control group 1 (male borrower 
group). 
The figure without bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 2 (those 
who have joined at best 1 year). 
The figure in [  ] bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 3 (those 
who have not joined at all but have the potential to join the microcredit programme). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Female  borrower group Control group  
 NGO-led non-NGO led 
Indicators of 
„entitlement‟  
 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
EEN  1 3.30 3.20 
 
3.35 
 
3.05 2.60 
 
 
1.30 
 
[1.09] 
1.50 
(1.85) 
[1.30] 
1.50 
(1.80) 
[1.25] 
1.70 
 
[1.30] 
1.55 
(2.20) 
[1.75] 
EEN  2 1.13 1.30 
 
1.05 
 
1.05 1.00 
 
1.00 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.00) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.00) 
[1.00] 
1.10 
 
[1.05] 
1.05 
(1.30) 
[1.00] 
EEN  3 3.23 3.33 
 
3.10 
 
3.20 2.80 
 
1.30 
 
[1.15] 
1.50 
(1.85) 
[1.40] 
1.40 
(2.00) 
[1.25] 
1.50 
 
[1.20] 
1.30 
(2.30) 
[1.15] 
AVERAGE 
LEVEL 
2.55 2.61 2.50 2.43 2.13 1.20 
 
[1.08] 
1.33 
(1.57) 
[1.23] 
1.30 
(1.60) 
[1.17] 
1.43 
 
[1.18] 
1.30 
(1.93) 
[1.30] 
  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE    1.4 
 
                LEVEL OF „PARTICIPATION‟ ELEMENT 
 
 
 
Source: sample survey 
The figure in ( ) represents the figure corresponding to control group 1 (male borrower 
group). 
The figure without  bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 2 (those 
who have joined at best 1 year). 
The figure in [  ] bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 3 (those 
who have not joined at all but have the potential to join the microcredit programme).                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Female borrower group Control group 
 NGO-led non-NGO led 
Indicators of 
„participation‟ 
   
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
EPP  1 3.40 3.27 
 
3.50 
 
3.25 
 
 
3.15 
 
1.30 
 
[1.10] 
1.20 
(1.55) 
[1.25] 
1.30 
(1.90) 
[1.35] 
1.30 
 
[1.20] 
1.35 
(1.30) 
[1.25] 
EPP  2 3.63 3.37 
 
3.20 
 
 
3.60 3.05 
 
1.40 
 
[1.25] 
1.60 
(1.00) 
[1.15] 
1.45 
(1.80) 
[1.20] 
1.50 
 
[1.35] 
1.30 
(1.70) 
[1.20] 
EPP  3 3.30 
 
 
3.57 
 
3.45 
 
3.55 3.05 
 
1.35 
 
[1.10] 
1.10 
(1.05) 
[1.00] 
1.20 
(1.70) 
[1.30] 
1.10 
 
[1.00] 
1.20 
(1.60) 
[1.30] 
AVERAGE 
LEVEL 
3.44 3.40 3.38 3.47 3.12 1.35 
 
[1.15] 
1.30 
(1.20) 
[1.13] 
1.32 
(1.80) 
[1.28] 
1.30 
 
[1.18] 
1.28 
(1.53) 
[1.25] 
                                                          TABLE  1.5       
                    LEVEL OF „BUILDING AWARENESS AND CAPACITY (EAC)‟ 
 
 Female  borrower group Control group 
 NGO – led non – NGO- led 
Indicators of 
EAC element 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
EAC  1 2.97 
 
2.80 2.60 
 
2.55 2.65 
 
1.45 
 
[1.20] 
1.50 
(1.70) 
[1.01] 
1.70 
(1.70) 
[1.10] 
1.40 
 
[1.15] 
1.35 
(2.10) 
[1.20] 
EAC  2 1.20 
 
1.87 1.00 
 
1.10 1.00 
 
1.00 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.00) 
[1.00] 
1.05 
(1.00) 
[1.00] 
1.30 
 
[1.20] 
1.10 
(1.10) 
[1.05] 
EAC  3 2.23 
 
2.40 2.35 
 
2.40 2.05 
 
1.05 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.00) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.00) 
[1.00] 
1.20 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.10) 
[1.00] 
EAC  4 2.97 
 
2.97 3.10 
 
2.95 2.60 
 
1.15 
 
[1.00] 
1.10 
(1.25) 
[1.09] 
1.05 
(2.00) 
[1.00] 
1.10 
 
[1.00] 
1.10 
(2.10) 
[1.00] 
EAC  5 2.27 
 
2.27 2.20 
 
2.20 2.05 
 
1.00 
 
[1.00] 
1.20 
(1.15) 
[1.10] 
1.05 
(1.10) 
[1.00] 
1.20 
 
[1.00] 
1.10 
(1.10) 
[1.10] 
EAC  6 2.80 
 
2.90 2.85 
 
2.65 2.65 
 
1.05 
 
[1.05] 
1.10 
(1.20) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.70) 
[1.00] 
1.30 
 
[1.05] 
1.10 
(2.00) 
[1.00] 
EAC  7 3.20 
 
3.30 3.20 
 
2.90 2.55 
 
1.85 
 
[1.20] 
1.70 
(1.60) 
[1.10] 
1.70 
(2.10) 
[1.10] 
1.40 
 
[1.20] 
1.75 
(2.60) 
[1.07] 
EAC  8 1.53 
 
2.47 2.20 
 
2.10 1.95 
 
1.00 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.10) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.40) 
[1.10] 
1.10 
 
[1.05] 
1.05 
(1.60) 
[1.02] 
EAC  9 2.20 
 
2.37 1.90 
 
1.75 1.75 
 
1.10 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.05) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.50) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.60) 
[1.00] 
EAC 10 1.60 
 
3.43 1.65 
 
1.50 1.45 
 
1.00 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.10) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.20) 
[1.00] 
1.10 
 
[1.00] 
1.05 
(1.30) 
[1.00] 
EAC 11 1.70 
 
2.40 1.15 
 
1.45 1.30 
 
1.05 
 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.05) 
[1.00] 
1.00 
(1.00) 
[1.00] 
1.20 
 
[1.05] 
1.10 
(1.20) 
[1.00] 
AVERAGE 
LEVEL 
2.24 2.56 2.20 2.14 2.00 1.15 
 
[1.04] 
1.15 
(1.20) 
[1.03] 
1.14 
(1.40) 
[1.03] 
1.21 
 
[1.06] 
1.15 
(1.62) 
[1.04] 
Source: sample survey 
The figure in ( ) represents the figure corresponding to control group 1 (male borrower 
group).    The figure without bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 
2 (those who have joined at best 1 year).     The figure in [  ] bracket represents the figure 
corresponding to control group 3 (those who have not joined at all but have the potential 
to join the microcredit programme). 
 
 
      
 TABLE 2 
 
             LEVEL OF „EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN‟ 
 
 Female Borrower Group 
 
 
Control Group 
 NGO-led non-NGO-led 
 
Elements of 
Empowerment 
model  
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
model 
1 
model 
2 
model 
3 
model 
4 
model 
5 
 
Power 2.79 2.70 
 
2.80 
 
2.33 2.43 
 
1.40 
 
[1.11] 
1.83 
(1.69) 
[1.48] 
 
1.50 
(1.75) 
[1.39] 
1.60 
 
[1.29] 
1.51 
(1.38) 
[1.20] 
Autonomy & 
Self-reliance 
2.87 2.94 
 
2.96 
 
2.75 2.64 
 
1.70 
 
[1.43] 
2.10 
(1.93) 
[1.55] 
 
1.80 
(2.30) 
[1.49] 
2.05 
 
[1.58] 
2.04 
(1.95) 
[1.56] 
Entitlement 2.55 2.61 
 
2.50 
 
2.43 2.13 
 
1.20 
 
[1.08] 
1.33 
(1.57) 
[1.23] 
 
1.30 
(1.60) 
[1.17] 
1.43 
 
[1.18] 
1.30 
(1.93) 
[1.30] 
Participation 3.44 3.40 
 
3.38 
 
3.47 3.12 
 
1.35 
 
[1.15] 
1.30 
(1.20) 
[1.13] 
 
1.32 
(1.80) 
[1.28] 
1.30 
 
[1.18] 
1.28 
(1.53) 
[1.25] 
Building 
Awareness & 
Capacity 
2.24 2.56 
 
2.20 
 
2.14 2.00 
 
1.15 
 
[1.04] 
1.15 
(1.20) 
[1.03] 
 
1.14 
(1.40) 
[1.03] 
1.21 
 
[1.06] 
1.15 
(1.62) 
[1.04] 
Empowerment 
level of 
Women 
2.78 2.84 
 
2.77 
 
2.60 2.50 
 
1.36 
 
[1.16] 
1.54 
(1.52) 
[1.28] 
 
1.40 
(1.77) 
[1.27] 
1.52 
 
[1.26] 
1.46 
(1.68) 
[1.27] 
 
Source: sample survey 
The figure in ( ) represents the figure corresponding to control group 1 (male borrower 
group). 
The figure without bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 2 (those 
who have joined at best 1 year). 
The figure in [  ] bracket represents the figure corresponding to control group 3 (those 
who have not joined at all but have the potential to join the microcredit programme). 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes                           
 1   First control group has 60 households  selected randomly from male SHGs 
participating under microcredit programme on SHG-NGO and SHG-Non-NGO  models 
for eight years or more; second control group has 60 households selected randomly from 
those women SHGs from both SHG-NGO and SHG-Non-NGO  models which have  
participated in the microcredit programme for at best one year; third control group has 
120 households selected  through „propensity score matching‟ technique from the 
households who are eager to join the micro credit programme but have not yet joined the 
programme. 
2.     Broadly, there are mainly two different models which have emerged under the SHG-linkage 
approach operating microfinance activities in West Bengal. Each of the two different models is 
further classified into three linkage approaches in the following (as per Secondary Data).  
 
 
                     SHGs  linkage approach  operating in West Bengal 
 
 
 
 
   SHG – NGO                                                SHG – NON – NGO 
 
 
 
SHG-Bank    SHG-Bank   SHG-Bank                   SHG             SHG-Bank      SHG-Bank 
  linkage          linkage         linkage                    Cooperative      (Model 4)        (Model 5) 
(Model 1)      (Model 2A)*    (Model 2B)*            (Model 3)     
 
 
      NGO               NGO              NGO as             SHG                    SHG                  Direct 
        as                    as                   Micro                  as                 organised               linkage 
    Promoter        financial            Finance           member of       under state             approach 
           intermediaries    Institutions           PACS             sponsored                                        
                                                                                          programme 
                 
* While we undertook pilot survey at preliminary stage in order to examine whether all   
models exist in practice, we found NGO as Microfinance Institution and NGO as 
financial intermediaries do not exist separately. Therefore, Model 2A and Model 2B have 
been clubbed together into a single category termed as Model 2 (NGO as Financial 
Intermediaries).  
3.  The propensity score is a conditional probability that an individual is assigned to the 
treatment group (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).Generally, it is estimated by using logistic 
regression (i.e. logit model) with the covariates collected from the participants as X and the 
participant‟s status on the treatment variable as Y (Rosenbaum, 1987). The covariates in the logit 
model are non-treatment variables such as the participant‟s background characteristics. The 
estimated propensity score abstracts the information of these covariates.  
The true propensity score (P) is the conditional probability that an individual 
belongs to the treatment group (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). It is functionally related to the 
covariates (X, in a vector format), noted as the logit model of X
p
p
 

)
1
ln( , indicating the 
natural logarithm of the odds (i.e., the ratio of P  to 1-P ) is  a linear combination of covariates, 
X.  The propensity score estimated by a function of 1
ˆ
)1(ˆ 
 XeP  , summarizes the distribution 
information of all potential covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984).  
Using estimated propensity scores, a participant from the treatment group can be 
matched with a participant from the control group so that treatment group and control group can 
be balanced. This approach can significantly reduce bias in observational study (Rosenbaum, 
1987, 2004; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Rubin and Thomas, 1992)  
The aim of matching is to find the closest comparison group from a sample of 
non-participants to the sample of programme participants. „Closest‟ is measured in terms of 
observable characteristics. 
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